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Policy Rules and Targets: Framing 
the Central Banker’s Problem
Stephen G. Cecchetti
entral bank policymakers are not primarily
random number generators.1 Reading both
the financial press and the work of academics,
however, one might get the opposite impres-
sion. Reporters (and the readers of their stories) seem to
attach considerable importance to each Federal Open
Market Committee policy decision. Academic work on the
impact of central bank policy gives a similar impression, as
statistical procedures produce a time series of pure white
noise innovations that are labeled “policy shocks.”2 But
central bankers expend substantial energy attempting to
tailor their actions to current economic conditions. In
other words, policymakers are reacting to the environment,
not injecting noise.
But what is central bank policy anyway? The policy-
maker’s problem can be characterized in the following way.
Using an instrument such as an interest rate, together with
knowledge of the evolution of the economy (aggregate
output and the price level), the policymaker seeks to stabi-
lize output and prices about some path that is thought to
be optimal. In carrying out this goal, the policymaker
must often trade off variability in output for variability in
prices because it is generally not possible to stabilize
both. This process yields what most people would call a
policy rule, that is, a systematic rule for adjusting the
quantity that the central bank controls as the state of the
economy fluctuates. In other words, the study of policy
should focus on the systematic portion of policymakers’
actions, not the shocks.
In this essay, I discuss a number of conceptual and
practical issues associated with viewing policymaking in
this analytical framework. These issues include the implica-
tions for policymaking of the slope of the output-inflation
variability trade-off, the influence of various types of uncer-
tainty on the policymaker’s problem, the consequences of
the fact that the nominal interest rate cannot fall below
zero, and possible justifications for interest rate smoothing.
Stephen G. Cecchetti is executive vice president and director of research at
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
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Although my intention is to raise, rather than
resolve, key questions concerning the formulation of a pol-
icy rule, I do offer important new evidence on one point.
This concerns the potential consequences of the move by
many central banks to adopt some form of price-level or
inflation targeting. In taking this approach, central banks
are implicitly altering the relative importance of inflation
and output variability in their objectives, increasing the
weight they attach to the former relative to the latter. But
the data suggest that the output-inflation variability trade-
off is extremely steep, implying that an effort to decrease
inflation variability modestly could lead to a significant
increase in output variability. Thus, policymakers consider-
ing pure inflation targeting should be aware that their
change in emphasis could have undesirable side effects.
AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
FOR POLICY FORMULATION
As I suggested in the introduction, central bank policy can
be thought of as the solution to a problem in which the
policymaker uses an interest rate to stabilize the variability
of output and prices about some path. A truly complete
description of the policymaker’s problem begins with an
intertemporal general equilibrium model based on a social
welfare function (tastes), production functions (technol-
ogy), and market imperfections that cause nominal shocks
to have real effects (nominal rigidities). The goal would be
welfare maximization.
I do not propose to delineate the fully specified
problem. Instead, I begin with a commonly used quadratic
loss function that might be a second-order approximation
to the objective function in this more detailed problem.3
The policymaker seeks to minimize the discounted sum of
squared deviations of output and prices from their target
paths. The general form of such a loss function can be
written as
(1)                        
                                                                                  
where   is the (log) aggregate price level,   is the (log)
aggregate output,   and   are the desired levels for 
and y,   is the discount factor, h is the horizon,   is the
relative weight given to squared price and output devia-
tions from their desired paths, and   is the expectation
conditional on information at time t.4 The loss function
provides the policymaker with information about
preferences over different paths for the variance of output
and prices.
A complete formulation of L requires description
of   and  . I will focus on the desired price path, ignor-
ing issues concerning  .5 Here we encounter the follow-
ing question: Should the objective be a price-level path or
an inflation rate? The first of these, level targeting, would
dictate that
(2)                        ,
where   is the desired steady level of inflation. That is,
the optimal price level this period is the optimal level last
period plus some optimal change (which may be zero). The
alternative, rate targeting, is
(3)                            ,
where the current target price level is just the last period’s
realized price level plus the optimal change.
The difference between price-level and inflation
rate targeting is the path for the variance of prices. Level
targeting implies more volatile short-horizon prices and
less volatile long-horizon prices than does rate targeting.
To see this, simply note that equation 3 implies that
                               ,
which can be a random walk.6
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Central bank policy can be thought of as the 
solution to a problem in which the policymaker 
uses an interest rate to stabilize the variability 
of output and prices about some path.
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The description of the loss function is now com-
plete. It is a function of the parameter vector
. The values of each of these will
depend on the underlying economic structure, that is,
tastes and technology. The preference for paths with
greater or lesser degrees of variability in output relative to
variability in prices, as embodied in the loss function,
depends on the fundamental reason that these things are
costly. The same is true of the desired steady level of
inflation, .
The policymaker’s problem cannot be solved with-
out knowledge of the dynamics of output and prices as
functions of the policy control variable and the stochastic
forcing process driving the economy. These relations,
which are taken as constraints in the optimization problem,
describe the structure of the economy. For the purposes of
the current discussion, I will assume that the central bank
policy is carried out using an interest rate,  ,7 and that the
innovations to the economy come from a series of real and
nominal shocks (that is, aggregate demand and aggregate
supply shocks), which can be written as  .8 The reduced
form for the evolution of output and prices can then be
written as 
(4)
                                 ,
                                                     
where   is an   matrix of (possibly infinite-
order) lag polynomials in the lag operator L.9 The coeffi-
cients in   describe a reduced form of the economy.
For the moment, I will ignore the fact that   is likely
to change when the policy rule changes.10
We can now characterize the policymaker’s
problem as choosing a path for   that minimizes the loss
(equation 1), with either equation 2 or equation 3 substi-
tuted in for  , subject to equation 4. The result is a policy
rule, which I will write as 
(5)                                  ,
where   is a (possibly infinite-order) lag polynomial.11
This path for interest rates as a function of the innovations
to the economy (which could be written as differences in
the observable quantities) is the policy rule. Significantly,
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 is a function of the parameters  , as well as the coef-
ficients in   and the covariance matrix of  ,  . 
I would like to emphasize that the preferences for
the evolution of output and price variability, as well as the
optimal steady inflation rate  , are inputs into the policy-
maker’s problem.12 In practice, I expect that these inputs
would be dictated by some legislative or executive body in
the government, as they are in some countries (although
not in the United States). Given this objective (the loss
function) and a model for the evolution of output and
prices (the economy), the policymaker chooses a rule that
governs the path of the control (the interest rate).13
CONCEPTUAL ISSUES AND PRACTICAL 
CONSIDERATIONS
The preceding section provides an analytical framework for
understanding the policymaker’s task, or “problem.” In this
section, I use this framework to explore several issues relat-
ing to policy formulation. Although I leave many questions
unanswered, my approach casts new light on some old
problems and suggests directions for future research.
I will consider five issues. I begin by exploring the
nature of a target. I proceed to a discussion of the practical
problems posed by the apparent steepness of the output-
inflation variability trade-off and consider how it might
influence decisions. This is followed by a general discussion
of how uncertainty affects policymaking. Next, I discuss
how the nonlinearity created by the fact that the nominal
interest rate cannot fall below zero influences the policy
rule. Finally, I explore the issue of interest rate smoothing.
POLICY TARGETS
If we accept the view that policy formulation is essentially
the solution to the analytical problem of choosing a path
for a control variable given a loss function, then how
should we interpret the current debate over the proper
choice of a policy target, and the advisability of targeting
in general? I will explore two ways of addressing the issue
of targets. The first is purely technical, and the second has
to do with the way policymakers might portray their
objective to the public. Technically, the first-order
conditions (or Euler equations) to the loss minimization
f L () q
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problem I describe above may be interpreted as producing
a type of targeting regime. To see this, consider the case
examined in detail by Svensson (1996b). He considers pure
inflation rate targeting and a loss that is independent of
output variation  . The first-order condition of this
problem implies setting the path for expected inflation,
, as close to the optimal value,  , as possible.
Svensson refers to this as “inflation forecast targeting.”14
a 1 = ()
Etpti + p*
This analysis can then be used to justify public statements
by policymakers that they are targeting inflation forecasts,
as a rhetorical device that substitutes for the more complex
and less accessible statements that would be needed to
describe their entire procedure.
Ball’s (1997) analysis suggests another justifica-
tion for targets. The argument is that the loss minimiza-
tion procedure of the type described in the preceding
section is too difficult to explain to the population at large
(and possibly their elected representatives as well), and so
will not lead to policy that is transparent enough to ensure
the proper level of accountability.15 But a pure inflation
targeting rule is easy to explain and, more important, easy
to understand and monitor. As a result, if the solution to
the complex problem can be approximated by a simple
rule, there may be substantial virtue in adopting the
approximate solution.
A related issue concerns the usefulness of interme-
diate targets. Over the last half-century or so, many mone-
tary economists have advocated targeting various monetary
aggregates. Consider the example of M2.16 Researchers do
not claim to care about M2 for its own sake, nor do they
claim that central banks can control it exactly. Therefore,
M2 is neither a direct objective nor an instrument. Instead,
it is somewhere in between—an intermediate target—and
the target path would again be akin to the first-order con-
ditions of the optimal control problem.
I find it difficult to make an argument for mone-
tary aggregates as intermediate targets. To see why, con-
sider the case in which the policymaker controls an interest
rate and cares about the price level  . To control the
objective, the policymaker must know how prices respond
to changes in the exogenous environment (the response of
 to  ) and how the objective responds to changes in the
instrument. But how does an intermediate target such as
M2 help? Clearly, if the relationship between interest rates
and M2 and that between M2 and prices are both stable
and precisely estimable, then looking at the two relation-
ships separately yields no advantage. In some instances,
estimating the impact of interest rates on M2 and the
impact of M2 on prices separately might give a more reli-
able estimate of the product of the two, but such instances
would surely be rare. If M2 helps forecast prices, then it
will be included in the model. But there is substantial evi-
dence, some of which is in Cecchetti (1995), that reduced-
form inflation forecasting relationships are very unstable
even if they include M2 or any other potential intermediate
target.17 
As a result, the only case I can see for intermediate
targeting is that it contributes to policy transparency.
Svensson (1996b) describes an ideal intermediate target
that “is highly correlated with the goal, easier to control
than the goal, easier to observe by both the central bank
and the public than the goal, and transparent so that
central bank communication with the public and public
understanding and public prediction of monetary policy
are facilitated” (pp. 14-5). But since monetary aggregates
cannot be closely controlled, are only weakly correlated
with both output and inflation over horizons of months
or even several years, and have changing definitions
that make them difficult to explain, they fail to meet
most of Svensson’s criteria.
THE OUTPUT-INFLATION VARIABILITY TRADE-OFF
One of the most important practical issues facing policy-
makers concerns the output-inflation variability trade-off.
To measure this trade-off, I turn to some earlier empirical
estimates of the impact of central bank policy on output
and prices (Cecchetti 1996). In effect, these estimates are
d 1 = ()
pt et
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Note:  The dotted lines represent standard deviation bands of ±2.
Price Response to Policy Innovation
the lag polynomials in equation 4 associated with  .18
Chart 1 plots the impulse response functions, or dynamic reac-
tions of prices and output to innovations ( ’s), on the
same vertical scale. The most important point to note is
that the impact of policy innovations on output is both
large and immediate. By contrast, policy affects prices only
very slowly, and by much more modest amounts. Further-
more, the precision of the estimates is quite poor.
It is important to keep in mind that standard
econometric methods, such as those employed here, assume
that parameters are constant over significant historical
periods. That is, the vector autoregression (VAR) method
used to estimate the response of output and prices to inter-
est rate movements presumes that these reactions are fixed
over the 1984-95 sample used in the estimation. Numer-
ous things can cause these relationships to change. As I
emphasize in Cecchetti (1995), shifts in central bank policy
rt
et
regimes during the 1970s and 1980s will result in changes
in the impulse response functions plotted in Chart 1. In the
context of the current discussion, this means that I can reli-
ably measure the output-inflation variability trade-off
given the policy regime that was in place over the decade
ending in 1995. I cannot reliably estimate the impact of
dramatic changes in the policy regime on the trade-off.19
To continue, with the aid of a very simple model,
these estimates can be used to give some sense of the shape
and slope of the output-inflation variability trade-off. Con-
sider the simple one-period case in which the horizon in
the policymaker’s loss function   is zero, the discount
factor   is irrelevant, target levels of output   and
prices   are zero (in logs), and the structure of the econ-
omy is such that
(6)                         ,    and
(7)                         , 
where   and   are aggregate demand and aggregate sup-
ply shocks. Demand shocks raise both output and prices,
while supply shocks move them in opposite directions. I
assume that the two types of shocks are uncorrelated and
that the variance of the supply shocks is normalized to one,
while the variance of the demand shocks is given by  .20
The parameter   is a measure of the impact of policy inno-
vations on output relative to their impact on prices. The
example is meant to represent the medium-horizon impact
of policy on the variables of interest. In this simple linear
case, the policy rule will be
(8)                               .
Equation 8 implies that
(9)                    and
(10)                 .
Minimizing the loss function
(11)                        yields
(12)                          and
(13)                         .
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Variance in output
Chart 2
The Inflation-Output Variability Trade-off
1984-95
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Source:  Author’s calculations.
Substituting these into the variance expressions 9 and 10
yields   and   as functions of  ,  , and  .
Using the monthly data from Cecchetti (1996), I
can now compute an approximate output-inflation vari-
ability frontier. From Chart 1, I approximate   as the mean
of the response of output to the mean of the response of
prices to an interest rate shock. The result, the average
value over a thirty-six-month horizon for the 1984-95
period, is -6.74. The medium-run horizon chosen for these
calculations is relevant to policymaking. In a full multi-
period framework, the definition of   would be more com-
plicated, but its interpretation would remain the same.
Once I determine  , the ratio of the variance of
demand shocks to the variance of supply shocks, then vary-
ing   allows construction of the frontier. Setting   to
0.46 forces the frontier to pass through the value implied
by the data (the ratio of output to price variability is
approximately 3.72), and normalizing the variance of the
detrended log price level in the data to be equal to one
gives Chart 2. The ‘‘X’’ marks the value implied by the
data. Note that the 1984-95 data suggest that policymakers
were operating as if   were approximately 0.93. This is
consistent with the importance attached to low and
steady inflation over this period.
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Significantly, Chart 2 shows that the trade-off is
extremely steep. Reducing inflation variability entirely by
setting   creates an extremely high level of variabil-
ity in real output. In fact, moving from the historically
observed point where the ratio of output to inflation
variability is 3.72, setting   to zero would increase the




contrast, reducing output variability from 3.72 to zero
increases price variability from 1.0 to 1.65. This finding is
not a consequence of the simplicity of the example, but
rather of the fact that   is so large. It is straightforward to
show that the maximum value of  , at  , is 
times the maximum value of  , at  , minus one.
That is to say, the points where the line in Chart 2 inter-
sects the x- and y-axes are solely determined by the size of
the ratio of policy innovations’ impact on output to policy
innovations’ impact on prices.21
This result has important implications for the cur-
rent policy debate. As many central banks move toward
some form of price-level or inflation targeting, they are
implicitly changing the relative importance of output and
inflation variability in their objective function, raising 
toward one. From a purely pragmatic point of view, some-
one who cares about the aggregate price path loses little by
allowing   to be less than one. The reverse, however, is
emphatically not true. Someone who cares about output
variability is made substantially worse off by a decision to
target the path of the price level. As a result, when consid-
ering policies based on prices alone, policymakers must be
very cautious and ask whether they really care so little
about output and other real quantities.
Because the estimate of   plays a crucial role in
these conclusions, some comment on its statistical properties
g
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Someone who cares about output variability is 
made substantially worse off by a decision to 
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Chart 3
Impact of Uncertainty on the Variability Trade-off
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is in order. Unfortunately, the estimate is extremely impre-
cise, with an estimated standard error in excess of 18.22
This difficulty almost surely stems from the relative stability
of inflation during this period and the small and impre-
cisely estimated response of aggregate prices to policy
innovations.23 The immediate implication is that it is very
difficult to be confident of the slope of the variability
trade-off. It could be somewhat better, but it could also be
substantially worse. A natural reaction to this is to examine
the implications of uncertainty for the optimal policy rule.
UNCERTAINTY
How does uncertainty affect policy? Of the numerous types
of uncertainty that might influence central bank policy
decisions, two forms are examined here: uncertainty about
the impact of policy changes (on output and prices) given
the model of the economy, and uncertainty about the
model itself.24
It is straightforward to consider the first of these,
which is the sampling error from the estimation of the
reaction of prices and output to changes in the policy
instrument. In the simple example here, this is just the
variance of the estimated  , which I will call  . Brainard
(1967) originally noted that this type of uncertainty leads
to caution in that policy rules imply smaller reactions.25 In
this simple example, inclusion of   implies that the
policy parameters a and b become
(14)                     and
(15)                  .
Reactions to a given shock are now smaller.
In a more realistic, multiperiod context, account-
ing for parameter uncertainty can be very difficult. Is it
likely to be worth the trouble? To get some sense of the
impact of parameter uncertainty, I use the results from the
previous exercise. If, as I found there, the estimate of   has
a standard error equal to 18.7, then the variance will be
350! The results, plotted in Chart 3, suggest that the
impact is huge: the variability frontier shifts out dramati-
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computed the implied value for   so that the inflation-
output variability frontier again goes through the point
implied by the data. This occurs when   equals 0.08 and
 equals 0.89, compared with 0.46 and 0.93 in the cer-
tainty case. Interestingly, assuming that policymakers have
minimized the simple loss function (equation 11) in the
presence of uncertainty leads one to conclude that aggre-
gate demand shocks have been substantially less important.
But the real implication of uncertainty is that the
frontier is now substantially steeper, and the reaction
function parameters a and b are significantly smaller. In
fact, taking account of the changes in both the parameters
and the average size of a typical demand or supply shock,
I conclude that uncertainty leads to reactions that are
on the order of one-twenty-fifth what they were in the
certainty case.
What about model uncertainty? There are essen-
tially two problems here. First, past history may not be a
reliable guide to the impact of future policy actions,
because underlying economic relationships, which policy-
makers had previously been able to exploit, may change.
Such changes could be brought about by policy itself. It is
this point, first noted by Lucas (1976), that has driven
many macroeconomists to work on dynamic general equi-
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foundations. But these efforts are still at too early a stage to
be of practical use.
Second, there is little agreement over the true
structural model of the economy. McCallum (1997) argues
convincingly that, as a result of this lack of consensus, a
policy rule should be robust to the possibility that numer-
ous models are correct. In the context of the analytical
framework presented in this essay, identifying such a rule
would mean exploring the implications of various  s,
each of which corresponds to a different model. The object
would be to look for a rule that would perform well for a
wide range of choices. One method for handling model
uncertainty would be to treat it as variance in the estimate
of the parameters in  .26 Overall, however, I am forced
to conclude that we know very little about how to solve
this problem.
THE ZERO NOMINAL INTEREST RATE FLOOR
What average inflation level should the policymaker target?
There are two parts to this question. First, what is the opti-
mal level of inflation,  ? Second, should policy allow the
average realized level of   to deviate from this level?
I argued above that   should be dictated to the
central bank by social welfare considerations. Quite a bit of
work has been done on the possible labor market benefits
of modest inflation, suggesting that the optimal level may
exceed zero. Most recently, Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry
(1996) and Groshen and Schweitzer (1997) consider
whether small positive levels of aggregate inflation can
facilitate real adjustments in the presence of an aversion to
nominal wage declines. But Feldstein (1996) contends that
the tax distortions created by inflation reduce the level of
output permanently, an argument that suggests   may
even be negative.27 Overall, we await further research for
the definitive resolution of this issue.
There is one dominant argument for why policy-
makers might choose to allow average inflation to deviate
systematically from the optimal level. The argument,
raised in Summers (1991), concerns the case in which 
is zero, and focuses on the fact that the nominal interest
rate cannot fall below zero. In fact, any choice of 









that in the historical record, the real interest rate (at
least ex post) has often been negative. But if central bank
policymakers successfully target zero inflation, then the
fact that the nominal interest rate cannot be negative
means that the real interest rate must always be positive. In
essence, this restricts the ability of the policymaker to
respond to certain shocks. The control problem as it is
described above does not explicitly consider the fact that 
is bounded at zero. As a result, there will be realizations of
 in which the policy rule (equation 5) would imply nega-
tive values for the nominal interest rate. One interpretation
of Summers’ point is that negative nominal interest rates
may in some instances be desirable, with the result that mean
inflation may deviate from the optimal level in order to
allow for a complete response to some larger set of shocks.
To see the point, consider the simple model pre-
sented in the discussion of the output-inflation variability
trade-off. Then, the restriction that   implies that the
loss is minimized for target inflation equal to approxi-
mately 0.276 . That is, average inflation will be approxi-
mately one-quarter of the standard deviation of the shocks
to the price level. More complex forms of the model will
have similar properties. In general, the greater the likeli-
hood of a shock driving the desired nominal interest rate
below zero, and the higher the loss associated with not
being able to react to such a shock, the higher will be the






In general, the greater the likelihood of a shock 
driving the desired nominal interest rate below 
zero, and the higher the loss associated with not 
being able to react to such a shock, the higher 
will be the average level of inflation that 
minimizes the policymaker’s loss function.FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / JUNE 1998 9
Chart 4














A similar result would arise when the loss function
is asymmetrical. It has been argued that deflation brings
potential costs that are distinct from those that come from
realized inflation that is less than expected. These costs
arise largely because the zero nominal interest rate floor
implies that deflation beyond a certain level increases the
real interest rate (ex ante and ex post), resulting in a lower
steady-state capital stock.28 This relationship suggests that
realized prices below the target may be more costly than
equivalent realizations above the target. This would natu-
rally create a positive bias in the policy rule that would
result in average inflation exceeding  .
To gauge the extent of this problem, I compute
the frequency with which the ex post real interest rate has
been below zero and below -1.0 percent (see table). Note
that the problem is clearly most severe for the United
States and France. But for other countries it is relatively
modest. In fact, assuming that inflation includes an
upward bias of roughly 1 percentage point, the realized real
interest rates were negative less than 20 percent of the time
in all countries except the United States.
INTEREST RATE SMOOTHING
Another important issue for central bank policymakers
concerns the desirability of smoothing the changes in the
policy instrument. There are two issues here. First is the
question whether, following a shock, the optimal response
is to have interest rates move immediately up (or down)
and then return smoothly down (or up) to the steady-state
level, always moving in the same direction following the
initial jump. Second, if policymakers intend to change
p*
interest rates by some amount, should the entire change
occur all at once?
The policy reaction function immediately yields
the answer to the first question. Here the presumption
must be that   is not monotone. That is, it does not
imply movements in which interest rates jump initially
and then return to the initial level, always moving in the
same direction. To see this, consider Chart 4, which plots
the optimal reaction of interest rates to an innovation in
the aggregate price level implied by the impulse response
functions plotted in Chart 1 (for the case where
and ).29 The path is hump-shaped. That is,
the optimal response to an innovation is to raise interest
rates immediately, continue to raise them gradually, and
then lower them slowly. This pattern could be further
exaggerated if the loss function included an explicit cost to
changing interest rates—a term of the form  .
The second question is more difficult. If the central
bank were to decide that the interest rate should be
increased by 100 basis points, should the change be in
one large jump or in a series of smaller ones? If policy
were sufficiently transparent that everyone knew that the
interest rate would ultimately rise 100 basis points, so
that the changes would be perfectly anticipated, then it is
difficult to see why a series of smaller changes would be
f L ()
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2
 FREQUENCY OF NEGATIVE EX POST REAL INTEREST RATE
Percentage of Observations That Are
 Country
Date of
Initial Observation Greater Than Zero Greater Than -1.0
 France Jan. 1970 68 82
 Japan Nov. 1978 82 96
 Germany Jan. 1970 94 99
 Italy Nov. 1979 94 95
 United Kingdom June 1974 77 80
 United States Jan. 1970 69 78
Notes: The interest rate is the rate on three-month Treasury securities, or 
equivalent. Data are monthly.10 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / JUNE 1998
As Alan Blinder (1997) has recently pointed out,
however, there is a potential conflict between central bank
independence and representative democracy. Since one of
the crucial elements of a democratic society is that the
powerful policymakers are accountable to the people, how
can we square these two apparently disparate goals of
accountability and independence?
Blinder (1997) and Bernanke and Mishkin (1997)
suggest that the solution is policy transparency. They argue
that if policymakers announce targets and are forced to
explain their actions in relation to these preannounced
goals, then there is accountability. Put another way, trans-
parency and accountability are enhanced if the elected
officials announce the loss function that the central bankers
are charged with minimizing, and if the central bankers in
turn demonstrate how they are accomplishing this goal.
Researchers have suggested that the publication of the
target paths for prices and/or output would serve this
purpose. In fact, not only would policymakers become
more accountable, but their policies would become more
transparent. 31
Arguments such as these have led to the imple-
mentation of explicit targeting regimes in a number of
countries. Prominent among these countries are Australia,
Canada, Finland, Israel, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, and
the United Kingdom.32 Because explicit targeting regimes
are transparent, they are easily understood. As a result,
potential policy actions are less likely to create uncertainty
and instability.
LESSONS FOR POLICY FORMULATION
This analysis offers a number of lessons. First, and most
important, if a policymaker were to focus on inflation
alone, the likely result—in the absence of fundamental
changes in the structure of the economy—would be a very
high level of real output variation. This finding provides
strong support for the very flexible way in which policy
targeting is currently carried out around the world.
Consider the example of the countries that have
adopted explicit inflation targeting—Australia, Canada,
Finland, Israel, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, and the
preferred over a single one. But often, I suspect, this
question is asked with a different intention. In fact, policy-
makers will start to change interest rates without really
knowing what the final results are likely to be. That is,
uncertainty about the likely impact of the policy action
on the objective will prompt policymakers to make gradual
moves so that they can monitor the results—a strategy
that may help improve the precision of policymaking.
SHOULD CENTRAL BANKERS 
FOLLOW RULES?
The entire discussion thus far has been directed at the con-
struction of a rule for central bank policy. But what is our
motivation for constructing a set of systematic responses to
external events? There are two important reasons to sup-
port the adoption of rules by the central bank. The first is
the well-known finding that, when policymaking is based
on pure discretion rather than rules, the dynamic inconsis-
tency problem leads to high steady inflation. The second
reason concerns the importance of policy transparency.
Over fifteen years ago, Barro and Gordon (1983)
noted that if a policymaker cannot credibly commit to a
zero inflation policy, then even if the policymaker
announces that inflation will be zero and all private deci-
sions are based on the assumption that inflation will in fact
be zero, it is in the policymaker’s interest to renege and
induce inflation of some positive amount. The reason for
this is that at zero inflation, the value of the increase in
output obtained from fooling private agents and creating a
transitory increase in output (along a Phillips or Lucas sup-
ply curve) more than offsets the cost of the higher inflation,
and so the claim of zero inflation in the absence of commit-
ment is not credible. In the language of optimal control, a
zero inflation policy is not dynamically consistent.
Since the problem is thought to be most severe
when potentially short-sighted legislators are capable of
influencing central bank policy directly, the most promi-
nent solution has been to create independent central banks.
It is commonly thought, and the data confirm, that policy-
makers who are more independent are better able to make
more credible commitments to low-inflation policy. 30FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / JUNE 1998 11
United Kingdom, among others. The central banks in
most of these countries appear to take into account
short-to-medium-run real fluctuations when deciding
on their policies. This approach is most evident in the
banks’ official statements. For example, the central
banks in New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and a
number of other countries announce target ranges—
rather than point targets—for inflation. The Reserve
Bank of Australia states that its goal is to have inflation
average between 2 and 3 percent over the business cycle. By
using this wording, the central bank retains the flexibility
to stabilize in the face of short-run real shocks. Even
countries with explicitly stated inflation targets behave
as if they place some weight on output variability in
their implicit loss function.
No country has adopted a zero inflation target, or
even a range that is centered at zero. In fact, Haldane
(1995, p. 8) reports that only New Zealand’s target range
includes zero at the lower end. This suggests that countries
continue to be wary of the possibility of deflation and sen-
sitive to the dangers inherent in bumping against the zero
nominal interest rate floor.
The calculations in this essay also underscore the
high degree of uncertainty attending the analysis of central
bank policy rules. First, I note that the estimated responses
of output and inflation to innovations in interest rate
policy are extremely imprecise. In other words, policymakers
are very unsure about the likely impact of their actions on
their objectives. Since I am able to quantify this uncer-
tainty, I can proceed to measure its impact on optimal
policymaking. Thus, when I explicitly account for the
imprecision of the econometric estimates needed to formu-
late a rule, I find that the optimal reaction of interest rates
to external economic shocks declines by a factor of about
twenty-five.
Let me conclude by emphasizing that substantial
work remains to be done before we can convincingly artic-
ulate a detailed and operational rule for central bank policy.
The framework I have proposed requires crucial informa-
tion on which there is simply no general agreement at this
date. What is most needed is a set of stable numerical
estimates of the impact of policy actions on output and
prices—as well as the ability to estimate the impact of
exogenous shocks on the goals of policy.12 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / JUNE 1998 NOTES
ENDNOTES
This essay is a revised version of a paper prepared for the Symposium on
Operations Research 1997, held at Freidrich-Shiller University, Jena,
Germany, on September 3-5, 1997. The author thanks Paul Bennett, Kenneth
Kuttner, Margaret Mary McConnell, Lars Svensson, and Dorothy Sobol for
comments. The views stated herein are those of the author and not necessarily those
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System.
1. Here I paraphrase a comment made by Bennett McCallum at a
conference on monetary policy in January 1993.
2. A naive reading of the recent work of Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Evans (1994a, 1994b) surely could lead to such an interpretation.
3. Throughout the discussion in this section, I assume that
policymakers can credibly commit to whatever rule they choose. I return
to this issue in my discussion of the dynamic consistency problem later
in the essay.
4. In some formulations, the loss function includes an additional term
in the change in the control variable. That is, changes in interest rates are
assumed to be explicitly costly. Inclusion of such a term here adds very
little to the analysis.
5. Specifying a process for   would be difficult because there is no
agreement on several crucial issues. For example, should   have a
random walk component or be a deterministic trend? Is the growth rate
in   affected by the volatility of  ?
6. It is possible to nest these two objectives into a more general
formulation. Consider a parameter   representing the relative
weight given to price-level targeting and inflation targeting. Then
. The percentage of the variance in 
explained by its random walk component will be related to  . 
7. The use of an interest rate is not necessary. The control variable could
be any quantity that is directly governed by the central bank. For
example, the monetary base or some measure of reserves could be used as
the control.
8. More specifically, this is a mean zero n-variate stochastic process with
finite second moments.
9. Equation 4 is the vector moving-average form. The more common
vector autoregression (VAR) is equivalent.





pt dp *t ()1 d – () pt 1 – p* + () + = * p
d
11. The linear-quadratic structure of the problem described here will
give rise to a linear policy rule. In most cases, however, the problem
would be structured differently, and the resulting rule would be more
complex. For example, if the loss function were nonlinear, or there were
some additional constraints on the policymaker’s behavior not considered
here, then the policy rule would be nonlinear as well.
12. Svensson (1996a) compares inflation and price-level targeting,
arguing that one yields better performance than the other under certain
economic conditions. Such an exercise relies on a particular view of the
costs of inflation that is not explicitly embodied in the loss function
(equation 1).
13. Ball (1997) takes a different approach, examining how the adoption
of ad hoc rules that are not derived directly from the loss function will
affect the loss. For example, after determining the minimized value of the
loss  , he then asks how close one can get by adopting a set of arbitrary
rules that do not arise from the optimal control problem itself.
14. Svensson (1997) notes that if  , so that weight is given to
output variability in the loss function, the result would be a form of
inflation forecast targeting in which the path of the forecast moves
gradually back to the optimal level.
15. See the discussion of policy transparency below.
16. For a recent discussion of M2 targeting, see Feldstein and Stock
(1994).
17. The procedures of the Deutsche Bundesbank reflect a different view
of intermediate targets. As Mishkin and Posen (1997) note, since 1988
the German central bank has targeted growth in M3 in the belief that the
demand for German M3 is stable.
18. The methods used to produce these results are described in detail in
that earlier work. Briefly, I estimate a four-variable VAR including
aggregate prices, commodity prices, industrial production, and the
federal funds rate using monthly data from January 1984 to November
1995. Central bank policy innovations are identified and used to estimate
the impulse response functions under the assumption that no variable
other than policy itself responds to policy shocks immediately.
19. This point is related to the discussion of model uncertainty below.
20. The fact that the coefficients on   and   in equations 7 and 8 are all
set to one is a simplification of no consequence for the main point I wish
to make. Setting the variance of   to one simply means that the variance
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21. Cecchetti (1996) considers a substantially more complex case with
the same results.
22. There are a number of ways to compute these standard errors. The
simplest, called the  -method, is to note that   is a nonlinear function
of the estimated parameters of the VAR. A first-order approximation of
this function, together with the estimated covariance matrix of the VAR
coefficients, can be utilized to compute a variance estimate for  .
23. It is possible to obtain much more (apparent) precision by
computing the average over a longer sample period. For example, using
data from 1967 to 1995, the estimate of   is -2.38, with a standard error
of 1.83. But it seems absurd to argue that the reaction function
embedded in the VAR is the same now as it was before 1980. This argues
strongly for focusing on the estimate from the post-1984 sample.
24. Because of lags in the data, there will also be uncertainty about the
current state of the economy. This type of uncertainty has an impact
similar to that of parameter uncertainty considered below.
25. Blinder (1997) notes that in a multivariate model, things are not so
simple, and the size and sign of covariances will determine whether
policymakers exhibit more cautious or less cautious behavior.
26. A simple possibility would be to multiply the estimated covariance





27. The problem of inflation bias is also relevant here because measured
inflation may systematically exceed true inflation. For example, Shapiro
and Wilcox (1996) argue that the U.S. consumer price index may
overstate inflation by 1 percentage point on average. Such a conclusion
suggests that even if   is zero, the central bank should attempt to keep
measured CPI inflation above zero.
28. See the discussion in Cecchetti (1997).
29. See Cecchetti (1996) for details on this computation. 
30. Alesina and Summers (1993) establish this empirically and raise the
additional possibility that countries with independent central banks not
only have lower steady inflation, but also have less variable output and
higher growth. Cukierman et al. (1993) also investigate the impact of
central bank independence on the growth rate of output.
31. Mishkin and Posen (1997) argue that policy transparency and
explicit targeting were important factors in the granting of operational
independence to the Bank of England.
32. See Haldane (1995) for a discussion.
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